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Local legislatures are fascinating sites of institutional experimentation, 
which legal scholars are only just beginning to describe, much less fully 
understand. Kellen Zale’s recent Article, Part-Time Government, provides an 
investigation into one particular question of institutional design—whether 
legislatures operate part-time or full-time—and offers lawmakers valuable 
insights into how to make that decision.1 In particular, Zale develops an incisive 
distinction between those functions that may go altogether unexercised as a 
result of the part-time legislature’s diminished capacity, such as constituent 
services and other political acts of representation, and those powers that are 
redistributed to other actors, especially the executive branch.2 More broadly, the 
Article continues to build a growing body of scholarship detailing the 
constitutional design of local government, an important shift in a field that has 
historically emphasized the intergovernmental relationships of local 
government over those governments’ internal structures.3  
But as this scholarship develops, it is important not to lose sight of one of 
local government law’s most traditional claims: that local government’s special 
(though hardly only) role in our federalist system is as a direct service provider. 
The federal government, the states, and cities, counties, and school districts all 
set education policy, but only the last, local set actually employs the teachers. 
This specialization in function bears with it structural consequences. At the local 
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level, the balance between regulation and service provision as modes of 
governance and policymaking tilts sharply towards the latter, with 
accompanying effects on the role of the legislative branch.  
Zale titles her Article “Part-Time Government.” But the Article focuses 
entirely on part-time legislatures—and just because the city council works part-
time, that doesn’t mean that teachers, police officers, or sanitation workers do. 
Zale’s easy identification of the government with the legislature is common, but, 
I argue, mistaken. Not only is service provision local government’s most 
traditional role, it is a highly governmental role. By defining government as 
legislation, Zale overlooks much of what makes local government distinctive 
and powerful. This Response insists on re-centering service provision, even 
when studying the structure of local government. 
Pairing Part-Time Government with an understanding of cities-as-service-
providers offers another benefit: a window into two methodological models 
used when studying local institutional design. The choice to employ legislators 
as full-time workers, part-time workers, or volunteers presents a classic 
bureaucratic question: how to hire staff. For traditional city services, many 
scholars believe that local governments have the incentives to make this kind of 
bang-for-your-buck choice relatively efficiently. Zale proceeds—implicitly, and 
for big cities, probably correctly—on the assumption that these incentives for 
efficiency do not extend to this particular issue of institutional design. In the 
absence of such incentives, municipalities need a helping hand in thinking 
through how to structure their legislatures. This is one model of studying local 
institutional design. But if the political dynamics that discipline city service 
provision extend to certain questions of local government structure, then 
scholars need not instruct cities on the answers to those questions. Under this 
second model, scholars should be learning from local governments’ choices. 
Identifying this methodological dichotomy, I hope, will allow for more careful 
identification of when and where each model best applies. 
I. LOCAL LEGISLATIVE DESIGN AND PART-TIME LEGISLATURES 
Local legislatures are strange creatures. They take a wide variety of forms 
and generally defy intuitions about legislatures developed by reference to the 
federal Congress. Studying their structure not only expands one’s sense of what 
a legislature could or should be, but also reveals much about how local 
governments choose to function.  
By comparison, state legislatures—which scholars hold up as diverse and 
distinctive4—hew closely to the federal model. Like Congress, forty-nine states 
 
 4 Grace E. Hart, State Legislative Drafting Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 126 
YALE L.J. 438, 444 (2016) (“[I]t is difficult to speak of ‘state legislatures’ as a whole because 
they are marked by tremendous diversity.”); see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, 
and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1329 n.33 (2016) (referencing scholarship analyzing 
diversity in state legislatures). 
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use a bicameral model, Nebraska being the sole exception.5 All states other than 
Nebraska use partisan elections to choose their legislatures.6 All fifty states, like 
the federal government, elect their representatives from districts—and the use 
of multi-member districts in state legislatures is increasingly rare.7 All states 
have some system of separation of powers, with the legislature independent and 
distinct from the governor’s office.8 State constitutional law sometimes diverges 
in stark, fascinating ways from the federal model,9 but when it comes to 
legislative design, the Madisonian framework is alive and well in statehouses.  
Not so for local governments. While the range of institutional choices before 
a local government is not infinite, it is vast. Local legislators are elected at-large 
and from districts—sometimes both in the same chamber.10 Elections can be 
partisan or nonpartisan.11 Local legislatures range in size from New York City’s 
fifty-one-person Council—large enough to have familiar institutions like a 
Speaker and committee chairs—to as few as three members, where there is little 
scope for internal hierarchy or specialization.12 
Some features of local legislative structure would be, from a state or federal 
perspective, rather outré. In my own research, I have explored the long transition 
of local governments away from bicameralism; the last bicameral local 
legislature only became unicameral in 2014.13 Proportional representation—that 
boogeyman of federal election law14—has been used by local governments big 
 
 5 Kim Robak, The Nebraska Unicameral and Its Lasting Benefits, 76 NEB. L. REV. 
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 6 Id.  
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REPS. (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/political_ 
commentary/commentary_by_thomas_f_schaller/multi_member_districts_just_a_thing
_of_the_past [https://perma.cc/BHN5-WYF7]. 
 8 Ethan Wilson, Separation of Powers and Legislative Immunity, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATORS (May 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/separation-of-powers-and-
legislative-immunity.aspx [https://perma.cc/XPU3-7BQV]. 
 9 See, e.g., Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of 
Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1135 (1999) (discussing positive 
rights in state constitutional law).  
 10 See, e.g., City Council, CITY OF BOS., https://www.boston.gov/departments/city-
council [https://perma.cc/5DDD-BVHK] (“The council is made up of four at-large 
councilors that represent the entire City, and nine district councilors that represent specific 
areas of the City.”). 
 11 See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher,  Informing Consent: Voter 
Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 385. 
 12 Compare Council Members and Districts, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, https://council 
.nyc.gov/districts/ [https://perma.cc/B2Q7-NBSB], and What We Do, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, 
https://council.nyc.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc/G4H2-DQP8], with City Council, CITY OF 
WATERVLIET, N.Y., https://www.watervliet.com/city/council.htm [https://perma.cc/B2CD-
RX4A]. A related variable is the ratio of representatives to population.  
 13 Noah M. Kazis, American Unicameralism: The Structure of Local Legislatures, 69 
HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1149 (2018) [hereinafter Kazis, American Unicameralism].  
 14 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019); see also Mitchell N. 
Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 820 (2005) (describing the 
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and small, although now only Cambridge, Massachusetts retains the system.15 
Many jurisdictions even guarantee seats for minority parties or independents, 
regardless of their success at the polls.16 Separation of powers is relatively rare: 
most local governments use a council-manager form that intermingles 
legislative and executive functions, and local governments commonly play a 
role in quasi-judicial land use decision-making.17 In New England, direct 
participatory democracy abounds, in the form of town meetings.18  
The design of the local legislature offers local governments a plethora of 
options, each rooted in its own take on democratic values and its own 
permutation of accountability, expertise, participation, and efficiency. Yet legal 
scholarship has barely catalogued the distinctive features of local legislatures, 
much less comprehended their dynamic interplay with each other. 
In this context, Kellen Zale has made a valuable contribution to the study of 
local legislatures, with an investigation of one specific question of institutional 
design: whether legislatures operate part-time or full-time. (States, like local 
governments, are split on this question.) 
Admittedly, this may not be much of a choice at all for the majority of 
municipalities. About half of municipalities have fewer than 1000 residents.19 
At that scale, it would be fiscally onerous to pay three, five, or seven full-time 
salaries just to the local city council. Take the small New Jersey borough of Hi-
Nella, population 860 (chosen for no particular reason other than its small-but-
 
“[s]pecter of [p]roportional [r]epresentation” in gerrymandering literature and 
jurisprudence). 
 15 Douglas J. Amy, A Brief History of Proportional Representation in the United States, 
FAIRVOTE, https://www.fairvote.org/a_brief_history_of_proportional_representation_ 
in_the_united_states [https://perma.cc/XQ6Q-QYAT].  
 16 See, e.g., Sean Collins Walsh, Philadelphia City Council Could See a Seismic Shift 
in the 2019 Election. Here’s What You Need to Know, PHIL. INQUIRER (Nov. 1, 2019), 
https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia-city-council-2019-election-candidates-2019 
1101.html [https://perma.cc/864E-NPRC] (noting that the Philadelphia charter guarantees 
seats for independents or minority-party candidates).  
 17 Moreau v. Flanders, 15 A.3d 565, 579 (R.I. 2011) (“[T]he separation of powers 
doctrine is a concept foreign to municipal governance.”). 
 18 Cities 101—Forms of Local Government, NAT’L LEAGUE CITIES, https://www.nlc 
.org/resource/cities-101-forms-of-local-government [https://perma.cc/J4YW-UCVS]. 
Many local governments, like some states, also use the electoral forms of direct democracy: 
the initiative and the referendum. See Gerald Benjamin, New York IS a Referendum State—
In Local Government, ROCKEFELLER INST. GOV’T (Apr. 25, 2017), https://rockinst.org/ 
blog/new-york-referendum-state-local-government/ [https://perma.cc/5M3Y-6BYZ] 
(noting that while referenda are a minor part of New York state governance, they are a major 
part of New York local governance).  
 19 Zale, supra note 1, at 1016 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2012 CENSUS OF 
GOVERNMENTS—ORGANIZATION (Sept. 2013), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/ 
2012/econ/gus/2012-governments.html (click on Table 7. Subcounty General-Purpose 
Governments by Population-Size Group and State: 2012) [on file with Ohio State Law 
Journal]).  
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reasonable size).20 In 2014, its total general appropriations were $922,714, and 
its mayor and five-person council appear to have been unpaid.21 Had they been 
paid the same (low!) salary as the municipal clerk—$33,500—and assuming no 
cuts in services, paying the legislature would immediately constitute over fifteen 
percent of the city budget.22 Taxpayers, rightly, aren’t going to stand for that. 
But for larger cities, the choice between a full-time and part-time legislature 
is a significant one. As Zale demonstrates, the part-time legislature may be far 
less diverse: few jobs provide the pay and flexibility to spend half a week 
working for a nominal stipend. If paired with a full-time executive branch, a 
city’s choice to use a part-time legislature may also reallocate power from the 
legislature to the mayor, city manager, or bureaucracy. In asking, “Where does 
that power go?” Zale poses precisely the right question.23 
Laudably, she also declines to offer a uniform answer—even at the rough 
level of ‘large cities should do this, small cities should do that.’ Institutions and 
history matter here, and what’s good for the goose is not always good for the 
gander. A criterion that Zale does not discuss—corruption—is illustrative. On 
the one hand, part-time legislatures are constantly at risk of mixing public and 
private interests: a recipe for self-dealing and conflicts of interest.24 But by 
paying legislators a salary—especially if there isn’t all that much legislative 
work to be done—a municipality might create a new pool of plum jobs, far 
outside the civil service system, for political machines to allocate. Alternatively, 
limiting outside employment might force underpaid council members to 
supplement their income through illicit means. Guessing which effect will 
predominate requires deep local knowledge about the culture and practices of 
local officials and political parties and the issues before the local legislature.  
Rather than offer a blanket endorsement of full-time or part-time legislators, 
Zale provides a framework for thinking through these issues. She identifies city 
councils (particularly those elected from districts) as more likely to focus on 
local concerns and to represent a diversity of interests as compared to the 
executive branch, and as more democratically accountable but less expert and 
efficient than city managers and other staff (who are often the beneficiaries of a 
weakened council).25 Readers might not necessarily agree on each step of the 
analysis. Zale claims, for example, that part-time legislatures spare us from 
 
 20 ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, Hi-Nella Borough, New Jersey, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/table?g=1600000US3432220&tid= 
ACSDP5Y2014.DP05&hidePreview=false&vintage=2018&layer=place&cid=DP05_
0001E [https://perma.cc/SFF9-DKPD].  
 21 BOROUGH OF HI-NELLA, BOROUGH OF HI-NELLA 2015 BUDGET EXPLANATORY 
STATEMENT 3a, http://hinellaboro.org/download/i/mark_dl/u/1779306/10516573/Hi-Nella 
%20Borough%20Budget%20(2015).pdf [on file with Ohio State Law Journal]. 
 22 See id.  
 23 See Zale, supra note 1, at 987. 
 24 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do Federal Criminal 
Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 113, 115 
(2005). 
 25 Zale, supra note 1, at 1042–43. 
6 SERVICE PROVISION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT [Vol. 81  
more politically effective NIMBYism,26 but I’d wager that in most 
municipalities, there is little room for growth on that score. Still, Zale offers a 
useful articulation of how to think through the question, with plenty of room to 
add one’s own variables as needed.  
Thus, in this response, I’d like to move away from the particular merits or 
demerits of part-time legislatures, to a larger point about how to study local 
legislatures. Analyzing local institutional design, including local legislative 
design, must account for local governments’ traditional role as service 
providers. Analyzing local legislative structure without that context risks 
misunderstanding the ways local governments make policy—the ways they 
govern. It also risks overlooking important theories about local political 
incentives that, though crafted with an eye to executive-branch service 
provision, might in some cases illuminate legislative design. Zale’s Article 
shows, in two ways, the necessity and payoffs of considering service provision, 
even when investigating local legislatures. 
II. PART-TIME GOVERNMENT OR PART-TIME LEGISLATURES? THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF LOCAL SERVICE PROVISION 
Service provision goes missing from Zale’s understanding of local 
government from the very start of the Article: its title. Zale titles her Article 
“Part-Time Government,” but it is really only about part-time legislatures. This 
is not an oversight by Zale, but rather a choice about how to view the import of 
her findings. Certainly, the title’s conflation of part-time legislatures with part-
time governments is not an aberration. The Article opens with the statement, 
“Part-time government is the rule, not the exception, for cities in the United 
States.”27  
But as Zale herself recognizes throughout the piece, just because the 
legislature meets part-time, doesn’t mean that the executive branch is so limited. 
Mayors might be part-time (especially in weak mayor systems where they are 
essentially one council member among many), and even city managers can be 
part-time, though I would guess that is less common.28 But a city with a part-
time legislature, like Dallas, doesn’t stop collecting trash three months of the 
year. Government, in the service-provision-sense that the average citizen 
experiences it, continues on year-round.  
What Zale seems to mean is that policymaking—as apart from service 
provision, constituent services, or even what she describes as “nuts and bolts” 
legislation setting fee schedules and keeping the city running—happens part-
 
 26 Id. at 1048. 
 27 Id. at 987. 
 28 See, e.g., Erik Yabor, Meigs Council to Interview City Manager Candidate, 
THOMASVILLE TIMES-ENTERPRISE (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.timesenterprise.com/ 
news/local_news/meigs-council-to-interview-city-manager-candidate/article_b0c1ac2d 
-94e0-58c0-b482-d0a6563e4e3c.html [https://perma.cc/XE6H-D5VL] (describing 
hiring for a part-time city manager).  
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time. There is a sense that big-picture, innovative lawmaking is the essential 
legislative act and even the essential governmental act. This isn’t unique to Zale; 
in fact, it is common among leading local government scholars. Richard 
Schragger, for example, in describing the increasingly aggressive state 
preemption of local laws (particularly worker and civil rights protections), has 
characterized such preemption as a “hostility to city government.”29 This is 
precisely the same identification of local lawmaking with local government: for 
the most part, conservative states have denied local governments regulatory 
power, not withdrawn their authority to provide services. Similarly, Gerald 
Frug, in decrying the weaknesses of local governments, has repeatedly called 
for the creation of new legislatures as the proper response.30 
At the federal level, it’s probably correct to treat legislation—or more 
broadly, regulation—as the fundamental governmental act. Congress 
determines how much you pay in taxes and how much you get back in social 
welfare programs; it defines what civil rights are protected and what are not; it 
chooses who may become an American and who is excluded. Without slighting 
the federal bureaucracy in the least, management of the Postal Service or the 
Forest Service simply has a less sweeping effect than the federal legislature’s 
power to define the fundamental legal framework under which the nation 
operates.  
But the same may not be true for local governments. Compared to Congress, 
local legislatures are at a decided disadvantage in the lawmaking process. 
There’s the Supremacy Clause, first and foremost. But local governments also 
suffer from problems of fragmentation and fiscal competition that impose 
practical constraints on local policymaking. As a result, local legislation is often 
better at sparking change than entrenching it: what Heather Gerken has called 
“dissenting by deciding.”31 In contrast, local governments hold the driver’s 
wheel for service provision. That’s reflected in basic employment numbers: 
while the federal government employs 2.7 million civilian workers, local 
governments employ over 10.5 million people.32  
Zale’s Article, by highlighting the co-existence of part-time legislatures 
with full-time administration, offers a chance to explore that disjuncture, and a 
new lens through which to look at cities’ outsized role in service provision and 
constrained lawmaking capabilities. Without weighing in on the very big 
question of when local governments should be empowered to legislate,33 I’d like 
 
 29 Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163, 1166 
(2018) (emphasis added).  
 30 See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1790–
91 (2002); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 294–95 (1993). 
 31 Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005).  
 32 ROBERT JESSE WILLHIDE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT & PAYROLL SUMMARY REPORT: 2013, at 2 (2014). 
 33 Volumes could be filled on the twin questions of home rule and preemption. For one 
recent discussion, see generally Nestor M. Davidson, The Dilemma of Localism in an Era of 
Polarization, 128 YALE L.J. 954 (2019).  
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to make the narrower claim that we shouldn’t give short shrift to the importance, 
and the governmentality, of ordinary service provision.34 
Those millions of local employees include police officers, who quite 
literally wield the power of life and death in daily interactions with the citizenry. 
For most Americans, police are government at its most sovereign, exercising the 
state’s monopoly on legitimate violence.35 Those local employees also include 
teachers, entrusted to guide and care for the most vulnerable and impressionable 
among us: children. On a weekday, many young children whose parents work 
full-time will spend more waking hours being cared for by their local 
government than by their parents. This is government at its most intimate.  
Local governments (and individual public employees) have immense 
discretion over how to exercise these powers, and that discretion goes well 
beyond questions of efficiency.36 A local police force that shakes down its 
citizens for fees and fines, or that targets communities of color for enforcement 
and the use of force, has made a choice about whom the state serves and whom 
it does not.37 Even for routine, day-to-day issues of administration—like a 
school’s choice to emphasize standardized test prep or add a music class, or an 
individual teacher’s choice of discipline for a misbehaving student—there are 
clear policy implications in how services are provided.  
Even outside the fundamentally governmental, and fundamentally local, 
functions of policing and education, other local services have similar dynamics. 
For over two million Americans living in public housing, a local government is 
their landlord (notably, that local government, a public housing authority, often 
lacks a “legislature” altogether, being governed instead by a “board”). In most 
senses, this is merely managerial service provision: housing authorities need to 
keep the heat running and the roof from leaking, to take out the garbage, and to 
do so cost-effectively. But a housing authority also makes difficult choices 
about when to evict a family and when to let them stay in their house—evicting 
a grandmother for her grandchild’s drug activity is an aspect of service 
provision, but it’s high-stakes policy, too.38 
 
 34 In this sense, I agree with Gerald Frug’s statement that city services should not 
merely be seen as “objects of consumption.” I disagree, however, with his depiction of 
current local practice as primarily embodying that understanding of city services. Even 
where residents “buy in” to an exclusionary town and its high-quality services, they buy in 
to an exclusionary government, not, as Frug sometimes puts it, a “country club.” Gerald E. 
Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 28–29 (1998).  
 35 See Noah M. Kazis, Special Districts, Sovereignty, and the Structure of Local Police 
Services, 48 URB. LAW. 417, 449–50 (2017). Incarcerated individuals, those at the border, 
and those engaged in military operations also deal with the hard core of state sovereignty.  
 36 See generally MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (30th ann. ed. 2010). 
 37 Cf. Paul Butler, The System Is Working the Way It Is Supposed To: The Limits of 
Criminal Justice Reform, 104 GEO. L.J. 1419, 1425 (2016) (describing racial subordination 
from legal police conduct).  
 38 See DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., NOTICE PIH 2015-19, GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC 
HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF FEDERALLY-ASSISTED HOUSING ON 
EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN HOUSING DECISIONS 2 (Nov. 2015), 
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Moreover, these decisions are governmental not only in the sense that they 
involve important questions of public policy, but also because they have public 
forms of participation and accountability. Voice, not exit, is often the primary 
tool for change.39 And the extent of that participation can be vast. As I’ve noted 
elsewhere, each of Chicago’s 279 police beats holds a monthly meeting, with an 
average of twenty-six residents attending each of those meetings.40 This is 
substantially more (and deeper) participation than takes place before the 
Chicago City Council.41 
True, there are also local functions, like picking up the trash, that are 
essentially substitutes for private market provision—here, there can be 
important distributional questions (tax-funded services may be more 
progressive than a pure fee-for-service model), but generally efficiency is the 
goal, and the ideological stakes are limited. Overall, though, local governments 
embed ideological and political questions of the highest stakes into the day-to-
day provision of public services.  
Local governments might be well-served by keeping their legislatures at 
work full-time. They might be better off spending more time legislating, and 
more of that time enacting what Zale calls “innovative, positive externality-
producing policies.”42 Zale is right to ask those questions. But asking about the 
proper extent of local legislative activity shouldn’t take anything away from the 
importance—and the “government-iness”—of the service provision that goes 
on 24/7 in most cities. Even a city that engaged in no legislation whatsoever 
would very much be a government, engaging the public and setting broad 
policies on matters of common concern.  
Many local governments have part-time legislatures. They don’t—not even 
as a rhetorical shorthand—have part-time governments. Suggesting otherwise 
 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/PIH2015-19.PDF [https://perma.cc/WWH6-2TAK] 
(“[I]n most cases, PHAs . . . have discretion to decide whether or not to . . . evict a household 
if a tenant, household member, or guest engages in certain drug-related or certain other 
criminal activity on or off the premises.”).  
 39 The threat of exit is always present in the background, of course; local governments’ 
small size and large number makes that threat far more credible and constraining than it is 
for higher levels of government. See Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use 
Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 
476 n.20 (1991). Even so, voice is often the more prominent and direct tool shaping the 
countless individual decisions that are required for service provision; at the micro level, the 
decision-making is more political and less analogous to the market. 
 40 Kazis, American Unicameralism, supra note 13, at 1207–08.  
 41 In 2017, the Chicago City Council began allowing one half-hour of public testimony 
per month. It did so only in response to a lawsuit. Reporting suggests that the city’s aldermen 
were not listening closely, if at all. John Byrne & Hal Dardick, Chicagoans Speak at City 
Council Hearing, But Did Aldermen Listen?, CHI. TRIB. (July 26, 2017), https:// 
www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-chicago-city-council-public-comment-met-2017 
0726-story.html [https://perma.cc/4GYT-EUCE]. 
 42 Zale, supra note 1, at 1051.  
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imports a federal vision of government, with the legislature at its center, to a 
local context where it does not belong. 
III. CITY STRUCTURES AS CITY SERVICES?: EFFICIENCY AND INTENT IN 
LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Thinking about local governments as service providers also offers a new 
window into Zale’s methodological approach to studying local government 
structure. Zale’s project in Part-Time Government is to “develop a set of 
normative criterion [sic] by which to judge the part-time model.”43 Such criteria 
are presumably needed because, at least in some set of cities, the wrong choice 
has been made. Zale suggests that large cities with part-time legislatures are the 
likeliest candidates for having picked incorrectly, in part because they never 
bothered to adapt their legislative design to their increased size and complexity 
(this seems true).  
Methodologically, this type of project embeds an assumption: that local 
governments need external guidance on how to design their own internal 
structures. That assumption, I argue, does not always hold. It doesn’t for 
questions of local service provision, and in certain contexts—perhaps including 
the choice to have a part-time legislature—questions of institutional design may 
not be so different from questions of service provision.  
Thus, Zale’s Article offers an opportune moment to ask: When do local 
governments have the capacity and incentives to choose the best institutional 
structures for themselves? And in turn, when should legal scholars help local 
governments make choices about their own institutional form, and when instead 
should we learn from the choices they have made? 
To develop this dichotomy,44 I begin with a comparison of local legislatures 
to other city services—a comparison that is particularly simple when dealing 
with part-time and full-time legislatures. The question of part-time status arises 
for all kinds of local employees. For example, small towns routinely decide 
whether to hire professional firefighters or instead rely on a volunteer fire squad 
(volunteer firefighters, like part-time legislators, have outside jobs and receive 
little-to-no compensation for their civic service). But most local government law 
scholars would assume that any given town has made a sensible-enough choice 
about how to provide fire services for itself.  
 
 43 Id. at 991.   
 44 Like many dichotomies, this is an artificially false choice. Scholarship can, and does, 
look at these questions from both angles. But the prominence of each perspective varies from 
piece to piece—or even from argument to argument. Local government law is uniquely 
confronted with an immense diversity of institutional designs, so it must be thoughtful about 
responding to that diversity. This dichotomy is meant to highlight the methodological 
choices and assumptions at play. 
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For a direct city service like fire protection, we assume a modicum of 
efficiency. The twin forces of Tiebout competition45—in which mobile 
individuals sort themselves into the local governments of their choice, avoiding 
inefficient packages of taxes and services—and “homevoter”-dominated local 
politics46—in which anxious homeowners ensure that no local policies run any 
risk of reducing the value of their home—combine to discipline local decision-
making. These models have their critics, to be sure, and there are important 
ongoing debates about the magnitude of their effects, but there is at least some 
empirical evidence supporting them.47 At a minimum, the model demonstrates 
that in a fragmented region, local governments have meaningful incentives to 
provide residents and businesses with the services they want in an efficient 
manner, and generally do so.  
For these basic city services, therefore, there isn’t tremendous need for legal 
scholars to weigh in on the pros and cons of, say, paid firefighting. If anything, 
legal scholars can learn from the choices local governments themselves make.48 
Voters and elected officials may not get every decision right, from either an 
empirical or normative perspective, but they have reasons for what they do, and 
those reasons can be revealing.  
This raises the interesting question: Does this type of argument apply to 
local institutional design, and not just to city services? And if so, when?  
After all, the City Council is from one perspective just a special kind of city 
service. It is one more budget line paid for out of property taxes, albeit one 
which in turn affects all the others. Neither mobile housing consumers nor 
resident homevoters should want to pay local legislators if those taxes don’t buy 
anything of value—as the earlier look at the Hi-Nella, New Jersey budget makes 
clear. Likewise, if a particular institutional structure is guaranteed to lead to bad 
outcomes—say, corruption, or wasteful spending—small jurisdictions should 
have ample incentives to avoid them.49  
 
 45 See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416 (1956). 
 46 See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS (2001).  
 47 Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging: Local Government Law as a (Partial) 
Cause of (and Solution to) the Current Housing Crisis, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663, 679 
(2010) (“[E]mpirical evidence is widely believed to confirm the existence of the Tiebout 
dynamic more generally (at least to some extent).”); Vicki Been et al., Urban Land-Use 
Regulation: Are Homevoters Overtaking the Growth Machine?, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 227, 235 (2014) (finding that most empirical studies generate results “that are at least 
consistent with the homevoter theory” in the suburban context).  
 48 Robert Ellickson, for example, has pointed out that the lack of municipal banks is not 
due to a complete legal prohibition on their creation, but rather due to voter behavior—the 
implication being that voters generally have some reason for not seeing their cities as proper 
banks. Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 
1572–73 (1982).  
 49 See David Schleicher, I Would, but I Need the Eggs: Why Neither Exit nor Voice 
Substantially Limits Big City Corruption, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 277, 285 (2011).  
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The extreme (entirely implausible) case makes clear that theories of local 
efficiency should at least sometimes apply to institutional design. Few 
households would choose to live in a town where, say, a single individual, 
chosen by lot, was given total, permanent, and unchecked power over all aspects 
of local government—and homevoters would surely mobilize against any such 
change to preserve their home values. But the logic extends to realistic changes 
to government structure as well.  
If neighbors are willing to rise up against the slightest off-chance of a low-
density development causing poor drainage, to use one of William Fischel’s 
famous examples, they should also care about who decides about drainage.50 
Presumably, maximizing the expected performance of their local government is 
what local voters think they are doing when they periodically debate changes to 
their form of government.51 If only as a derivative of their incentives for 
efficient service provision, local governments have incentives for efficient 
institutional design.52 
Moreover, local governments are, at least sometimes, perfectly capable of 
understanding and manipulating government structure to achieve their desired 
substantive outcomes. The history of voting discrimination is replete with 
conscious and effective efforts to use government structure, such as at-large 
districts, to achieve downstream effects.53 Shouldn’t, in some instances, local 
governments likewise be able to effectively manipulate government structure to 
improve city services, or to keep taxes low? 
Yet it is equally clear that in most cases, on most questions of institutional 
design, the political “market” can’t and doesn’t function efficiently at all. 
There’s too much uncertainty about the likely effects of any particular change 
in any particular place. Even political scientists can’t reach consensus on these 
issues. To take just one routine example from the legislative context, local 
 
 50 FISCHEL, supra note 46, at 9. 
 51 For example, Framingham, Massachusetts, the largest town in the state, replaced its 
representative town meeting system with a council-mayor system in 2017. According to the 
Charter Commission, the town had convened charter commissions in 1925, 1971, 1992, and 
1996. FRAMINGHAM CHARTER COMM’N, FRAMINGHAM CHARTER 2016/2017 (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.framinghamma.gov/DocumentCenter/View/25763/Final-City-Charter-2017---
Printed-Version [https://perma.cc/F3XZ-7BYL]. That same year, neighboring Newton, 
Massachusetts rejected a proposal to shrink the size of its city council in a close and hard-
fought vote. See Charter Commission, CITY OF NEWTON, MASS., http://www.newton 
ma.gov/gov/chartercommission/default.asp [https://perma.cc/R2A3-QBL5]. This is not a 
comprehensive review of that year’s government reforms even in the state of Massachusetts, 
much less the nation.  
 52 See, e.g., Oscar Gamble, Group Seeks to Amend Norristown Charter, Bring Back 
Mayor, TIMES HERALD (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.timesherald.com/news/group-seeks-
to-amend-norristown-charter-bring-back-mayor/article_5ff4ab67-0cb7-58e9-974e-237 
60b2bfab6.html [https://perma.cc/B8QV-G4DE] (reporting that advocates for re-
establishment of position of mayor cited diminished property values, high taxes, and poor 
service provision as arguments for structural change). 
 53 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 627 (1982). 
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governments must choose how many council members to have. Political 
scientists for many years believed in the “law of 1/n,” which suggests that larger 
legislatures will inefficiently spend more money.54 But more recent research 
indicates that whether this “law” holds may depend on five separate factors and 
that, in some cases, switching to a larger legislature can promote efficient 
spending.55 Those drafting local charters may have their own beliefs about the 
effect of legislative size on spending (not to mention on partisanship, land use 
decision-making, and all the rest), but there is little reason to think that belief is 
accurate or reliable.  
Put differently, voters and homebuyers may not be able to perfectly quantify 
the impacts of a property tax levy for the local schools, but they are perfectly 
positioned to get the gist of it and make an informed judgment. It’s not clear 
they can do the same for structural questions, where the causal chain is much 
more attenuated and the issues more abstract. Additionally, taxes and spending 
are adjusted annually, if not more often; institutional designs are changed only 
infrequently. Even if they were once efficient, they will not necessarily remain 
so.  
Indeed, there are many aspects of local institutional design that self-
evidently have nothing to do with efficiency—like the town meeting. Town 
meetings are fairly widespread among smaller municipalities in New England, 
but they are essentially nonexistent outside New England. This can’t be 
explained through stories about efficiency: it doesn’t pass the smell test that 
New England has town meetings because New Englanders are so good at 
participatory politics and everyone else so bad. Town meetings remain in New 
England because of history, political culture, and status quo bias, not 
institutional optimization. In such cases, the question is not what New England’s 
use of the town meeting teaches us (it tells us primarily where the town meeting 
was invented). The main question is what effect the town meeting has on New 
England. 
This discussion sets up two contrasting perspectives from which to study 
local government structure. In the first, the assumption is that local governments 
are structured so as to further some functional purpose and that governments’ 
design choices actually achieve those ends. If so, scholars can study those 
choices and discern what they reveal about local governments and local 
communities. In the second, the assumption is that local governments don’t 
accurately assess the likely outcomes of a given institutional design (or don’t 
 
 54 Barry R. Weingast et al., The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A 
Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics, 89 J. POL. ECON. 642, 650–54 (1981). 
 55 David M. Primo & James M. Snyder, Jr., Distributive Politics and the Law of 1/n, 70 
J. POL. 477, 478 (2008). The five factors are: “the degree of ‘publicness’ and congestion in 
the goods being distributed, the curvature of the benefit function, the degree of subsidy from 
the central government, deadweight costs of taxation, and the size of the legislature before 
the change.” Id.; see also Per Pettersson-Lidbom, Does the Size of the Legislature Affect the 
Size of Government? Evidence from Two Natural Experiments, 96 J. PUB. ECON. 269, 269 
(2012) (finding opposite effect from “law of 1/n” in some empirical contexts).  
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update their assessments in response to changed conditions). Under this model, 
scholars should help them make better choices.  
Part-Time Government leans strongly toward the second perspective. Zale’s 
Article offers a guide to local governments about how to choose whether to 
operate part-time or full-time (or to states on how to structure the choice). 
Although it identifies the many forces that push many cities towards part-time 
legislatures (including budget constraints and limited home rule authority 
leaving legislators with little to do), this is not the Article’s ultimate focus.56 In 
my own scholarship, in contrast, I’ve often prioritized the first perspective. In 
writing about local unicameralism, for example, rather than ask how cities 
should have structured their legislatures, I asked what about local government 
drove voters to choose a different legislative model for their cities and towns 
than for their states and the federal government.57 Likewise, in writing about 
policing, I have drawn conclusions about the perceived role of municipalities 
from the structure of police services, not suggested how policing ought to be 
assigned to municipalities or special districts.58  
Both of these angles on local government are valuable. Moreover, the use 
of each often reflects the underlying facts being studied. Unlike part-time or 
full-time status, every local government has adopted a unicameral legislature. 
Bicameralism was quite common in the 19th century, so this represents a steady 
shift, uniformly in one direction, over a period of many decades. It’s easier to 
imagine that local governments have chosen an institutional design 
intentionally, and gotten the results they sought, where so many governments, 
one after another, considered the same question and reached the same answer. 
Likewise, the lack of special police districts is a case of remarkable institutional 
convergence.59 Zale, in contrast, suggests that at least some big-city legislatures 
have simply failed to update their internal design and are ready to switch to full-
time status; this is a story of inertia rather than convergence, and a place where 
a normative scholarly intervention is well-placed. 
Thus, I offer this dichotomy not to suggest that one or the other approach is 
preferable, or even that one can be pursued entirely independently from the 
other. Rather, my goal is to make explicit assumptions that have been implicit. 
We can’t always learn from local institutional choices. Sometimes, what would 
be data are just noise: a mess of haphazard variation and the best guesses of 
(perhaps part-time!) local officials. But viewing local legislatures as a special 
case of city services offers a reminder that local governments have powerful 
incentives towards efficiency. Now and again, those incentives—paired with 
local knowledge—might determine the shape of local structures. When studying 
 
 56 Zale, supra note 1, at Part II.B.2. 
 57 Kazis, American Unicameralism, supra note 13, at 1180–1202.  
 58 Id. at 1185–86.   
 59 Convergence does not always imply efficacy, though it often might. Policies can 
cascade through their own momentum, and at moments of broad dissatisfaction with the 
status quo, there may be widespread shifts to the most available alternative, regardless of the 
merits of that alternative. I am grateful to Clayton Gillette for this point. 
2020] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 15 
local institutional design, scholars must be careful to ask who—the outside 
observers and the people on the ground—should be learning from whom. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Understanding the internal structures of local governments is not likely to 
be a quick or easy project. Scholars and courts have had more than two centuries 
to figure out the federal constitution—a single, shared document that barely 
changes—yet there’s still plenty of debate about what it means and how it works 
(some of it even novel). There are more than 90,000 local governments, of all 
shapes and sizes, and they are always evolving. We need all the help we can get 
to identify and analyze each feature of their own constitutional designs.  
In Part-Time Government, Kellen Zale adds one brick to that wall, 
identifying and analyzing an important feature of local legislatures. (Zale’s 
earlier Article on the compensation of city councils is another.60) That is, by 
itself, immensely productive. But as the study of local institutional design 
continues—as we develop a firmer and more precise descriptive understanding 
of local government—we can begin to ask some larger questions about the form 
of local government. This Response suggests that in doing so, we should not 
lose sight of local governments’ traditional role as service providers—nor of the 
political theories generated by those studying local public service provision. 
Even as local legislatures must be understood as important in their own right, 
they must also be understood in their proper—in many ways, junior—
relationship to local governments’ powerful executive branches.  
 
 
 60 See generally Kellen Zale, Compensating City Councils, 70 STAN. L. REV. 839 
(2018).  
